WPC Md8 vH8']-I7=S?B:Ύs Q ,eߢKtέKCA71AP.@9Y+ r^VpM kJujAɨz20mm^???@ MAMAMAMAMAMAMAWBYDtEIJJKL*M4NoWpXXYZZ![[,\\\}]ddddddddd B*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e*e B*GeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeGeqeqe^i^in o 1en}}#~E˄Pхх ѓѓ__2ՕW{p*p{Y|ԚPPۛfnH|̠Hء`~qqqqlĦ~ҧPiA׵i3Ʒ\eT +@3L! ]-j08hpjKKK#)))))))II{++QHP LaserJet 4,,,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,2S+P 0_level1  , ;1` hp x (#;23  ..  8.` hp x (#8   z ($USUS.,    2    _Ԁ514U.S.549(1995)*+s eH+ft+3|x.U  ' Matos0Matos .    #'USUS.,  _dXXMotiontoDismiss...  CriminalNo.00000 t Page  2  #X(Xd=#(EhCEKQW]cioAutoList2I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.(.(3($ !USUS.,      0  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i) I.  ($USUS.,    1    _Section1951(a),18U.S.C.,providesinitspertinentpart:    8  Whoeverinanywayordegreeobstructs,delays,oraffectscommerceorthe  movementofanymemorandumorcommodityincommerce,byrobberyorextortion t orattemptsorconspiressotodo,orcommitsorthreatensphysicalviolencetoany ` personorpropertyinfurtheranceofaplanorpurposetodoanythinginviolationof L  thissectionshallbefinednotmorethan$10,000orimprisonednotmorethantwenty 8  years,orboth. (;3$2#  0  .3  0  (5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I. ($USUS.,    3    _ԀCh.569,48Stat.979;currentversionat18U.S.C.1951(Supp.2000). ($USUS.,    4    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11843.SeealsoEvansv.U.S.,504U.S.255,261(1992).  ($USUS.,    5    _ԀLaurent,ReconstitutingUnitedStatesv.L;pez:AnotherLookatFederalCriminalLaw,  31 Colum.J.L.&Soc.Probs. 61,75(1997)( ThelanguageofLopez...mayhaverestricted  significantlytheFederalCommercePower,afactwhichwillfundamentallyalterthebalanceof  criminalauthoritybetweenthestatesandthefederalgovernment.Itslogic,ifextended,mayin x timepreventthefederalgovernmentfrompolicingactivitiesthathaveonlyminimaleffectson d interstatecommerce.)  ($USUS.,    6    _ԀUnitedStatesv.Bass,404U.S.336,349(1971).SeeBrickey,CriminalMischief:The  FederalizationofAmericanCriminalLaw,46 HastingsL.J. 1135,11381139(1995)( The   Constitutiondidnotdirectlyconferpowertoexercisegeneralcriminaljurisdiction,...Congresss  reluctancetoenactexpansivecriminallawsmayhavebeenpartlyattributabletoarecognition  thattheFoundingFathersneverenvisionedanationalpolicepower....Thefederalgovernments   assumptionofalimitedroleinmaintainingeverydaylawandorderleftprimaryjurisdictionover   criminalmatterswiththestates.Thatseemednaturalenoughbecausecrimewasamatterof t  principallylocalinterestandimpact.Murders, robberies ,rapes,andburglaries didnot `  implicateanyspecialfederalinterestunlesstheywerecommittedwithinafederalenclave . P  Moreover,thecriminallawwasanexpressionoflocalmoresandconcerns.)(emphasis @| supplied;footnotesomitted). ($USUS.,    7    _ԀLopez,514U.S.at562(quotingBass,404U.S.at349). ($USUS.,    8    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at552.<:Footnote Ref } ($USUS.,    13    _Ԁ315U.S.521(1942).(-2$ !USUS.,   ($USUS.,    9    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at553(quotingGibbonsv.Ogden,22U.S.(9Wheat.)1,195(1824)).( $     M ($USUS.,    10    _ԀSeee.g.Abbatev.UnitedStates,359U.S.187,195(1959)( [_T]he_Ԁprincipal  responsibilityfordefiningandprosecutingcrimesresideswiththestates.)  ($USUS.,    14    _CongressenactedtheAntiRacketeeringActtopunishtheuseofforceorfearasmeans  toacquireproperty.AntiRacketeeringAct2(b).Yetitalsoprescribedbroadexemptionsfor  labor,preservingtherighttostrikeandpicket.Moreover,theActexcluded thepaymentof  wagesbyabonafideemployertoabonafideemployeefromitsprovisions.Id.2(a),3(b).It t directedthecourtsnottoapplytheAct insuchmannerastoimpair,diminish,orinanymanner ` affecttherightsofbonafidelabororganizationsinlawfullycarryingoutthelegitimateobjects L  thereof.Id.6.Despitethisexemption,prosecutorsusedtheAntiRacketeeringActinthe 8  1930sand1940stoprosecutelaborunionofficialsaccusedofacceptingpaymentsforpromises $ t oflaborpeace.SeeFederalLegislation,LaborLawANewFederal_Antiracketeering_ԀLaw,35  `  _Geo_._L.J._ 362,374(1947). ($USUS.,    11    _ԀCh.569,48Stat.979;currentversionat18U.S.C.1951(2000). j ($USUS.,    12    _CommentsbySenatorCopelandcitedinUnitedStatesv.Local807,315U.S.521,528  530(1942).In1933,JohnDillingercommittednumerousinterstatearmedrobberiesthroughout  Indiana,OhioandWisconsin.George"MachineGun"Kellyscriminalactivitiescovered  Mississippi,Texas,NewMexicoandOklahoma.SeeNote,TheHobbsActandRICO:A t RemedyforGreenmail?,66 Tex.L.Rev. 647,659(1988). ($USUS.,    15    _ԀLocal807,315U.S.at526. 0 ($USUS.,    16    _See,e.g.,91Cong.Rec.11900(1945)(statementofRep.Hancock)( Ineffectit  [Local807]legalizesincertainlabordisputestheuseofrobberyandextortion.). ($USUS.,    17    _91Cong.Rec.11843,11844,11911. ($USUS.,    18    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11843.SeealsoEvans,504U.S.at261. | ($USUS.,    19    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11843. ($USUS.,    20    _ԀAntiRacketeeringAct,ch.569,3(a),48Stat.979,980(1934)(currentversionat18  U.S.C.1951).  ($USUS.,    21    _SeeCuratoetal,Note,GovernmentFraud,Waste,andAbuse:APracticalGuideto  FightingOfficialCorruption,58 NotreDameL.Rev .1027,104950(1983);Henderson,The  ExpandingRoleofFederalProsecutorsinCombatingStateandLocalPoliticalCorruption,8   _Cumb_.L.Rev. 385,39093(1977);Note,MisapplicationoftheHobbsActtoBribery,85 x  Colum.L.Rev. 1340,134146(1985). ($USUS.,    22    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11,912(1945)(commentsofS.Rep.Hobbs).  ($USUS.,    23    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11,904(1945)(remarksofRep.Hancock)(quotedinCulbert,435U.S.  at378);seealsoid.at11,912(remarksofRep.Hobbs) ($USUS.,    24    _Ԁ91Cong.Rec.11,911.SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Green,350U.S.415,41820(1956). ~ ($USUS.,    25    _Ԁ18U.S.C.1951(a). ($USUS.,    26    _ԀSee,e.g.,Stironev.UnitedStates,361U.S.212,218(1960). ($USUS.,    28    _ԀUnitedStatesv.Green,350U.S.415,420(1956).  ($USUS.,    27    _ԀBailey,516U.S.at145;UnitedStatesv.SunDiamondGrowersofCalifornia,526US  398,119S.Ct.1402(1999).  ($USUS.,    29    _ԀSeee.g.UnitedStatesv.Box,50F.3d345,352(5thCir.)(internalcitationomitted)  ("slight"effect),cert.denied,516U.S.918,116S.Ct.309,133L.Ed.2d213(1995);United  Statesv.Collins,40F.3d95,99(5thCir.1994)("deminimis"effect),cert.denied,514U.S.  1121,115S.Ct.1986,131L.Ed.2d873(1995).  ($USUS.,    30    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Collins,40F.3d95(5thCir.1994),andUnitedStatesv.Wang,  2000WL1060375(6thCir.(Tenn.)). w ($USUS.,    31    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Harrington,108F.3d1460(D.C.Cir.1997);UnitedStatesv.  Atcheson,94F.3d1237(9thCir.1996),cert.denied,519U.S.1156,117S.Ct.1096,137L.Ed.2d  229(1997);UnitedStatesv.Farmer,73F.3d836,843(8thCir.),cert.denied,518U.S.1028,  116S.Ct.2570,135L.Ed.2d1086(1996);UnitedStatesv.Stillo,57F.3d553,558n.2(7th t Cir.),cert.denied,516U.S.945,116S.Ct.383,133L.Ed.2d306(1995);UnitedStatesv. ` Bolton,68F.3d396(10thCir.1995),cert.denied,516U.S.1137,116S.Ct.966,133L.Ed.2d L  887(1996);UnitedStatesv.Robinson,119F.3d1205(5thCir.1997),cert.denied,522U.S. 8  1139,118S.Ct.1104(1998).SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Jarabek,726F.2d889(1stCir.1984); $ t UnitedStatesv.RiveraMedina,845F.2d12(1stCir.1988). ($USUS.,    32    _ԀRobinson,119F.3dat1212.  ($USUS.,    33    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Collins,40F.3d95(5thCir.1994),andUnitedStatesv.Wang,  2000WL1060375(6thCir.(Tenn.)). @ ($USUS.,    34    _ԀSee,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Collins,40F.3d99;UnitedStatesv.Martinez,28F.3d444,  445(5thCir.),cert.denied,513U.S.910,115S.Ct.281,130L.Ed.2d197(1994). ($USUS.,    35    _ԀE.g.,UnitedStatesv.Darby,312U.S.100,118(1941).  ($USUS.,    36    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at559.Seee.g.UnitedStatesv.Harrington,108F.3d1460(D.C.Cir.  1997),discussedinfra,textaccompanyingnotes______. * ($USUS.,    37    _ԀTheHobbsActalsodefinescertainkeyterms:    (1)Theterm"robbery"meanstheunlawfultakingorobtainingofpersonalpropertyfrom   thepersonorinthepresenceofanother,againsthiswill,bymeansofactualorthreatenedforce,  orviolence,orfearofinjury,immediateorfuture,tohispersonorproperty,orpropertyinhis  custodyorpossession,orthepersonorpropertyofarelativeormemberofhisfamilyorof   anyoneinhiscompanyatthetimeofthetakingorobtaining.     (2)Theterm"extortion"meanstheobtainingofpropertyfromanother,withhisconsent, t  inducedbywrongfuluseofactualorthreatenedforce,violence,orfear,orundercolorofofficial `  right. L     (3)Theterm"commerce"meanscommercewithintheDistrictofColumbia,orany 8t TerritoryorPossessionoftheUnitedStates;allcommercebetweenanypointinaState, $` Territory,Possession,ortheDistrictofColumbiaandanypointoutsidethereof;allcommerce L  betweenpointswithinthesameStatethroughanyplaceoutsidesuchState;andallother 8  commerceoverwhichtheUnitedStateshasjurisdiction.18U.S.C.1951(1996).For $  discussionsofthelegislativehistoryoftheHobbsAct,seeCulbert,435U.S.at37478;Callanan   v.UnitedStates,364U.S.587,59093(1961);UnitedStatesv.Varlack,225F.2d665,67172   (2dCir.1955);UnitedStatesv.Kemble,198F.2d889,89192(3dCir.1952)cert.denied,344   US893,73S.Ct.211,97L.Ed690,1952;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Green,358U.S.415,41820   &n.5(1956). e ($USUS.,    38    _ԀSee,e.g.,Lorillardv.Pons,434U.S.575,581(1978);AmericanAirlinesv.North  AmericanAirlines,351U.S.79,82(1956);Overstreetv.NorthShoreCorp.,318U.S.125,131  132(1943). ~ ($USUS.,    39    _Ԁ120S.Ct.1904(2000). ($USUS.,    40    _Ԁ18U.S.C.s1962(a)(c). ($USUS.,    41    _ԀUnitedStatesv.Robertson,514U.S.669,671(1995).Certdenied,517US1162,116  S.Ct.1557,134L.Ed.2d658,1996. ($USUS.,    42    _ԀSeeL;pez,514U.S.at559. { ($USUS.,    43    _Ԁ435U.S.371(1978) | ($USUS.,    44    _Ԁ350U.S.415(1956). ($USUS.,    45    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Green,135F.Supp.162,163(S.D.Ill.1955). ($USUS.,    46    _ԀGreen,350U.S.at421. | ($USUS.,    47    _ԀInStironethedefendantstoodconvictedofunlawfulinterferencewithinterstate  commerceinviolationoftheHobbsAct.ThemainissueaskedtheCourttodeterminewhether  theindictmentchargeddefendantwiththesameoffenseofwhicheventuallyconvicted.Id.at  213,80S.Ct.at271.Theindictmentchargedthatthedefendanthadinterfered,throughextortion, t withtheinterstatetransportof sandintoPennsylvania.Attrial,however,thegovernment `  introducedevidenceoftheinterferencewithsteelshipments.Thesteelincluded,asone  ingredient,concretemadefromsand.Thus,thegovernmentsoughttoestablishfederal  jurisdiction.Id.at214,80S.Ct.at27172.TheCourtnotedthattheextortionschemecould   havecausedtheinterstateshipmentofsandtoslackenorstop,andthat"[i]twastofree   commercefromsuchdestructiveburdensthattheHobbsActwaspassed."Id.Butreversedthe t  conviction,nevertheless.Sincetheindictmentconcerned sandnot steel,theintroductionof `  thatotherevidencecouldhavecausedthejurytoconvictthedefendantofacrimenotincludedin L  theoriginalcharge.Giventhisgroundforreversal,theCourtsinterpretationofthescopeofthe 8t HobbsActbecamedictum. ($USUS.,    48    _ԀId.at215(quoting18U.S.C.1951). | ($USUS.,    49    _Ԁ435U.S.371(1978). d&0 d d  ($USUS.,    50    _ԀLetterfromtheAttorneyGeneraltotheHouseCommitteeontheJudiciaryofMay18,  1934,quotedinLocal807,315U.S.at529.SeeSenatorCopelandcommentedthattheActwas  intendedto"closegapsinexistingFederallawsandtorendermoredifficulttheactivitiesof  predatorycriminalgangsoftheKellyandDillingertypes."Local807,315U.S.at52830. t ThoughtheCopelandCommitteedidnotdefinetheterm"racket,"they"foundthattheterm...had `  forsometimebeenusedlooselytodesignateeveryconceivablesortofpracticeoractivity L  whichwaseitherquestionable,unmoral,fraudulent,orevendisliked,whethercriminalornot."  8  Culbert,435U.S.371,375(1978)(quotingS.Rep.No.1189(1937)).  ($USUS.,    51    _ԀSeee.g.,UnitedStatesv.Provenzano,334F.2d678(3dCir.1964)(involving  extortionbylocalTeamsterofficialtopreventlaborslowdownsanddisruptions);UnitedStates  v.Kennedy,291F.2d457(2dCir.1961)(involvingconspiracytoobstructinterstatetrucking  shipments);UnitedStatesv.Persico,305F.2d534(2dCir.1962)(findingconvictionfor t hijackingatruckloadofgoodsmovingininterstatecommerceandconspiringtodoso);United ` Statesv.Floyd,228F.2d913(7thCir.1956)(involvingthreatsoflabordisruptionleveled L  againstalocalcompanyengagedintheconstructionofaninterstatecrudeoilpipeline);United 8  Statesv.Varlack,225F.2d665(7thCir.1955)(findinglaborunionrepresentativesallegedly $ t orchestratingstrikesthreatenedadditionalunrest"unlesswearetakencareof"byinterstate  ` shipper);Callananv.UnitedStates,223F.2d171(8thCir.1955)(involvingextortionof$28,000  L  fromconstructioncompanytopreventlaborslowdownsanddisruptionsduringtheconstruction  8  ofaninterstatepipeline). ($USUS.,    53    _ԀU.S.Const.art.I,8,cl.3,18;seealsoKatzenbachv.McClung,379U.S.294,301  02(1964). } ($USUS.,    52    _ԀChiefJusticeRehnquisthasrepeatedlyvoicedconcernabouttheincreasing  federalizationofcrimes. ThenumberofcasesbroughttothefederalcourtssaysRehnquistis  oneofthemostseriousproblemsfacingthemtoday.Criminalcasesfilingsinfederalcourtsrose  15percentin1998nearlytriplingthe5.2percentincreasein1997.Overthelastdecade, t Congresshascontributedsignificantlytotherisingcaseloadbycontinuingtofederalizecrimes ` alreadycoveredbystatelaws.AndtheChiefJusticeadds: Thetrendtofederalizecrimesthat L  traditionallyhavebeenhandledinstatecourtsnotonlyistaxingthejudiciarysresourcesand 8  affectingitsbudgetneeds,butalsothreatenstochangeentirelythenatureofourfederalsystem. $ t ThepressureinCongresstoappearresponsivetoeveryhighlypublicizedsocietalillor  ` sensationalcrimeneedstobebalancedwithaninquiryintowhetherstatesaredoinganadequate  L  jobintheseparticularareas,and,ultimately,whetherwewantmostofourlegalrelationships  8  decidedatthenationalratherthanlocallevel.Hon.WilliamH.Rehnquist,1998YearEnd $  ReportoftheFederalJudiciary(Jan.1,1999),at45.SeealsoHon.WilliamH.Rehnquist1993   YearEndReportontheJudiciary45,reprintedinTheThirdBranch(AdministrativeOfficeof   theU.S.Courts),Jan.1994,at1,3;Hon.WilliamH.Rehnquist,1992YearEndReportonthe   Judiciary1,34,reprintedinTheThirdBranch(AdministrativeOfficeofTheU.S.Courts),Jan.   1993,at13;Hon.WilliamH.Rehnquist,1991YearEndReportontheFederalJudiciary5, p reprintedinTheThirdBranch(AdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S.Courts),Jan.1992,at1,3.See \ alsoBrickey,CriminalMischief:TheFederalizationofAmericanCriminalLaw,46 Hastings H L.J. 1135,11471148(1995)( Thepracticalimpactofthepenchanttofederalizecrimeis 8 nowherebetterillustratedthaninthestoryofourfederalprisons.Between[1930]and1989,the (x numberoffederalprisonsrosefrom5to47,andthefederalprisonpopulationgrewfrom13,000 d tomorethan53,000.Withinthenextfiveyearsalone,thenumberoffederalcorrectional P  facilitiesnearlydoubled.Butthedemandformoreprisonspaceisendless.TheBureauisslated  toopenninenewprisonsin1995andtobeginconstructionorconstructionplanningatthree  othersitestorelieveovercrowdingandaccommodateadditionalanticipatedincreasesinthe   prisonpopulation.Thesystemwillhouseonaveragemorethan92,000offendersinfacilitiesit   controlsin1995.Inaddition,anaverageofmorethan10,500sentencedfederaloffenderswillbe t  housedinstateandlocaljailsandothercontractfacilities.)(footnotesomitted).(35;AGMSY_1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.  ($USUS.,    54    _ԀH.P.Hood&Sonsv.DuMond,336U.S.525,53435(1949).SeeLaurenceH.Tribe,  AmericanConstitutionalLaw54(2ded.1988)  ($USUS.,    55    _ԀLopez,514U.S.at568(Kennedy,J.,concurring)(citingJusticeMarshallinGibbons  v.Ogden,9Wheat.1,194,196,22U.S.1,194,196(1824)). z ($USUS.,    56    _Ԁ156U.S.1(1895). | ($USUS.,    57    _Ԁ298U.S.238(1936).  ($USUS.,    58    _Ԁ247U.S.251(1918).ThiscaselimitstheholdingofChampionv.Ames(TheLottery  Case),188U.S.321(1903),underwhichCongresscouldprohibitthetransportoflotterytickets  acrossstatelines.UnderHammer,CongresscouldnotmakeStatescomplywithitswishes.For  amodernversionof obligatedStatecomplianceseeSouthDakotav.Dole,483U.S.203 t (1987)(makingfederalhighwayfundscontingentonaStatesincreasingthedrinkingage). | ($USUS.,    59    _Ԁ295U.S.495(1935). | ($USUS.,    61    _Ԁ312U.S.100(1941). { ($USUS.,    60    _Ԁ301U.S.1(1937). w ($USUS.,    62    _ԀId.at12728.  ($USUS.,    63    _Ԁ514U.S.549(1995).Laurent,ReconstitutingUnitedStatesv.L;pez:AnotherLookat  FederalCriminalLaw,31 Colum.J.L.&Soc.Probs. 61,75(1997)( Thelanguageof  Lopez...mayhaverestrictedsignificantlytheFederalCommercePower,afactwhichwill  fundamentallyalterthebalanceofcriminalauthoritybetweenthestatesandthefederal x government.Itslogic,ifextended,mayintimepreventthefederalgovernmentfrompolicing d activitiesthathaveonlyminimaleffectsoninterstatecommerce.)  ($USUS.,    64    _Ԁ514U.S.at55153.Laurent,ReconstitutingUnitedStatesv.L;pez:AnotherLookat  FederalCriminalLaw,31 Colum.J.L.&Soc.Probs. 61,81(1997)( Theoverridingrationale  forthe[Lopez]decisionseemstobethelackofanystoppingpointfortheargumentsputforward  infavorofvalidatingtheGunFreeSchoolZonesAct.Thesearguments...aremethodologically x troubling.Potentiallyeveryhumanactivityisinsomewaynecessarytothefunctionofthe d nationaleconomy,andthusworthyoffederalprotection.Thesetypesofargumentsundermine P  theveryfoundationofthefederalsystembyrequiringtheSupremeCourttoaccept,atleast <  tacitly,thatthefederalgovernmentisagovernmentofunlimitedpowers.)  ($USUS.,    65    _ԀKathleenF.Brickey,CrimeControlandtheCommerceClause:LifeafterLopez,46   CaseW.L.Rev. 801,803(1996)(quotingFranklinD.Roosevelt,pressconference(May31,  1935),in4ThePublicPapersandAddressesofFranklinD.Roosevelt,200,221(SamuelI.  Rosenmaned.,1938)).AsJusticeKennedy,joinedbyJusticeOConnor,arguedinhisL;pez x concurrence: ThehistoryofthejudicialstruggletointerprettheCommerceClauseduringthe d transitionfromtheeconomicsystemtheFoundersknewtothesingle,nationalmarketstill P  emergentinoureracounselsgreatrestraintbeforetheCourtdeterminesthattheClauseis <  insufficienttosupportanexerciseofnationalpower.L;pez,514U.S.at568(Kennedy,J., ( x concurring).  ($USUS.,    66    _ԀUnitedStatesv.Robinson,119F.3d1205,1209(5thCir.1997).ButseeTushnet,  LivinginaConstitutionalMoment?:L;pezandConstitutionalTheory,46 CaseW.Res.L.Rev .  845,869870(1996)( Isuggestthatthepresentconstitutionalmoment,ifitisone,mayinvolve  theevaporationratherthandevolutionofpublicpower.Thatis,powermaynotbeflowingfrom x Congresstostateandlocalgovernments,butrathergoingintothinairor,moreprecisely,to d privateinstitutions,bothintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere.)(footnotesomitted) ($USUS.,    67    _Ԁ18U.S.C.922(q)(1)(A). ($USUS.,    68    _ԀUnitedStatesv.L;pez,2F.3d1342(5thCir.1993),affd,514U.S.549(1995). ($USUS.,    69    _ԀPrezv.UnitedStates,402U.S.146(1971). x ($USUS.,    70    _Ԁ514U.S.at558.  ($USUS.,    71    _ԀId.(quotingHeartofAtlantaMotel,Inc.v.UnitedStates,379U.S.241,256(1964)  (internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted)).. q ($USUS.,    72    _ԀId. { ($USUS.,    73    _ԀId.at55859  ($USUS.,    74    _ԀKennedysconcurrenceopinedthatL;pezleftintactCongresspowertoregulate  activitiesofacommercialoreconomicnature.514U.S.at574. ($USUS.,    75    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Robertson,514U.S.669(1995)(percuriam). q ($USUS.,    79    _ԀId. r ($USUS.,    80    _ԀId. ($USUS.,    81    _ԀId.at563. ($USUS.,    76    _ԀL;pezat55859. { ($USUS.,    77    _ԀId.at55961. y ($USUS.,    78    _ԀId.at561. y ($USUS.,    82    _ԀId.at563. ($USUS.,    83    _Ԁ120S.Ct.1740(decidedMay15,2000). ($USUS.,    84    _Ԁ120S.Ct1904(May22,2000). } ($USUS.,    85    _Ԁ42U.S.C.13981. ($USUS.,    86    _ԀMorrison,120S.Ct.at1749(footnotesomitted). z ($USUS.,    87    _ԀId.at1750. r ($USUS.,    88    _ԀId. ($USUS.,    89    _Ԁ120S.Ct1904(May22,2000). ~ ($USUS.,    90    _Ԁ18U.S.C.844(i). ($USUS.,    91    _ԀJones,120S.Ct.19081912. t ($USUS.,    92    _ԀId.at1910. w ($USUS.,    93    _ԀId.at191013. ($USUS.,    94    _ԀId.at1912(citingUnitedStatesv.Bass,404U.S.336,350(1971). ($USUS.,    95    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at558(quotingWirtz,392U.S.at197n.27). ($USUS.,    96    _ԀPolishNationalAlliancev.NLRB,322U.S.643,650(1944). ($USUS.,    97    _ԀSeeGibbons,22U.S.(9Wheat.)at197.  ($USUS.,    98    _ԀId.at555(quotingDarby,312U.S.at118,whichcitedMCullochv.Maryland,17  U.S.(4Wheat.)316,421(1819)). t ($USUS.,    99    _ԀPolishNationalAlliance,322U.S.at652(Black,J.,concurring).SeeU.S.Const.art.I,  s8,cl.18;MandevilleIslandFarms,Inc.v.AmericanCrystalSugarCo.,334U.S.219,231232  &n.11(1948);Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528,584585,  488US889,(1988)(1985)(OConnor,J.,dissenting);seealso1L.Tribe,American t ConstitutionalLaw812814&n.23(3ded.2000).  ($USUS.,    100    _ԀBarnett,NecessaryandProper,44UCLAL.Rev.745(1997);Gardbaum,Rethinking  ConstitutionalFederalism,74Tex.L.Rev.795(1996).  ($USUS.,    101    _ԀGardbaum,supranote171,at807808arguesthattheNewDealCourtbasedits  justificationfortheexpansionofthefederalpowerovercommerceontheNecessaryandProper  Clause,withoutdirectlyenlargingthescopeoftheCommerceClauseitself.Forexample,he  citesUnitedStatesv.Darby,312U.S.100,118119(1941),andJusticeOConnorsdissentin t Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528,584585(1985),488US ` 889,109S.Ct.221,102L.Ed.2d212,1988,whichpointedoutthat [t]heCourtbasedthe L  expansion[ofthecommercepower]ontheauthorityofCongress,throughtheNecessaryand 8  ProperClause,"toresorttoallmeansfortheexerciseofagrantedpowerwhichareappropriate $ t andplainlyadaptedtothepermittedend."Itisthroughthisreasoningthatanintrastateactivity  ` "affecting"interstatecommercecanbereachedthroughthecommercepower....[A]ndthe  L  reasoningofthesecasesunderlieseveryrecentdecisionconcerningthereachofCongressto  8  activitiesaffectinginterstatecommerce. ($USUS.,    102    _ԀSee1L.Tribe,AmericanConstitutionalLaw819(3ded.2000).  ($USUS.,    103    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at558559.ButseeOshidari,ProtectingFederalismorAssaulting  SeparationofPowers?TheProposedTenthAmendmentEnforcementAct,33 Loy.L.A.L.Rev.   775(2000)(voicingtheconcernthatcongressionalprotectionoftheprinciplesoffederalismin  reactiontoSupremeCourtcasesandPresidentialorders,woulditselfinfringeontheproper x sphereofjudicialinterpretationandexecutiveenforcement);Shane,Federalisms OldDeal: d WhatsRightandWrongwithConservativeJudicialActivism,45 Vill.L.Rev .201(2000) P  (presentingacarefulandmeticulouscriticismofL;pezanditsprogeny). ($USUS.,    105    _Ԁ120S.Ctat1750(emphasisadded). ($USUS.,    104    _Ԁ108F.3d1460(D.C.Cir.1997). ($USUS.,    106    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at561;seealso1L.Tribe,supranote113,at820821. ($USUS.,    107    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at567. ($USUS.,    108    _ԀSeeMorrison,120S.Ct.at1750. R ($USUS.,    110    _Ԁ__L;pez,at566,recognizedhowever,that adeterminationwhetheranintrastate  activityiscommercialornoncommercialmayinsomecasesresultinlegaluncertainty. ($USUS.,    109    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at561.  ($USUS.,    111    _ԀSeeBaker,StatePolicePowersandtheFederalizationofLocalCrime,72 Temp.L.  Rev. 673(1999).SeealsoClymer,UnequalJustice:TheFederalizationofCriminalLaw,70 S.  Cal.L.Rev .643(1997).ThreerecentSymposiaaddressthetopic.Mengler,TheSadRefrainof  ToughonCrime:SomeThoughtsonSavingtheFederalJudiciaryFromtheFederalizationof  StateCrime,43U.Kan.L.Rev.503(1995);Miner,CrimeandPunishmentintheFederal l Courts,43SyracuseL.Rev.681(1992);Schwarzer&Wheeler,OntheFederalizationofthe X  AdministrationofCivilandCriminalJustice,23StetsonL.Rev.651(1994);Chippendale,Note, D  MoreHarmThanGood:AssessingFederalizationofCriminalLaw,79Minn.L.Rev.455 0  (1994);Hollon,Note,AftertheFederalizationBinge:ACivilLibertiesHangover,31Harv.C.R.  l C.L.L.Rev.499(1996).Baker,NationalizingCriminalLaw:DoesOrganizedCrimeMakeIt  X  NecessaryorProper?,16RutgersL.J.495(1985);Bradley,RacketeeringandtheFederalization  D  ofCrime,22Am.Crim.L.Rev.213(1984);Cushman,TheNationalPolicePowerUnderthe 0  CommerceClauseoftheConstitution,3Minn.L.Rev.289(1919);Miner,FederalCourts,   FederalCrimes,andFederalism,10Harv.J.L.&Pub.Poly117(1987);Stern,TheCommerce   ClauseRevisitedTheFederalizationofIntrastateCrime,15Ariz.L.Rev.271(1973);Van   Alstyne,DualSovereignty,FederalismandNationalCriminalLaw:ModernistConstitutional   DoctrineandtheNonroleoftheSupremeCourt,26Am.Crim.L.Rev.1740(1989);Kenny, | Comment,FederalCriminalJurisdiction:ACaseAgainstMakingFederalCases,14SetonHall h L.Rev.574(1984).  ($USUS.,    112    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at561n.3(quotingBrechtv.Abrahamson,507U.S.619,635(1993),  andEnglev.Isaac,456U.S.107,128(1982)). | ($USUS.,    113    _ԀId.at566.  ($USUS.,    114    _ԀJusticeMarshallrecognizedthat congresscannotpunishfeloniesgenerallyin  Cohensv.Virginia,19U.S.(6Wheat.)264,428(1821).SeealsoMcCullochv.Maryland,17  U.S.(4Wheat.)316,41523(1819)whereMarshallarguedthatMemorandumIauthorizes  Congresstoenactcriminallawsonlyinafewareas(e.g.,piracyandcounterfeiting).That t authoritydidinclude,inMarshallsview,impliedpowerstopenalizecertainactionstoeffectuate ` itsotherMemorandumIpowers.Id.at41617.Forexample,therobberyofapostofficeto L  vindicateitsexpressauthoritytoestablishpostofficesandpostroads.Id.at417.Andthe 8  protectionoffederalproperty.UnitedStatesv.Coolidge,14U.S.(1Wheat.)415(1816). ($USUS.,    115    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at557. ($USUS.,    116    _ԀSeeid.at564565.SeealsoMorrison,120S.Ctat1750. { ($USUS.,    117    _ԀSeeBrickey,CriminalMischief:TheFederalizationofAmericanCriminalLaw,46   HastingsL.J. 1135,1138(1995);andPueblov.BatistaMontaez,1982WL210563(P.R.),113   D.P.R.307(1982),forahistoryofrobberyandlarcenyatcommonlawandinthecontinent.See  alsoUnitedStatesv.Hudson&Goodwin,11U.S.(7Cranch)32,3233(1812),(theSupreme  Courtresolvedthatfederaljurisdictionexcludescommonlawcrimes.)Morerecently,Carterv.   UnitedStates,120S.Ct.2159(No.995716;decidedJune12,2000)( ...[A] clusterofideas   fromthecommonlawshouldbeimportedintostatutorytextonlywhenCongressemploysa t  commonlawterm...[I]tisundisputedthat robberyand  larcenyaretermswithestablished `  meaningsatcommonlaw.[emphasisontheoriginal])  ($USUS.,    118    _Ԁ_Ashdown_,Federalism,Federalization,andthePoliticsofCrime,98 W.Va.L.Rev.   789textaccompanyingnote65(1996).( [_T]here_Ԁappeartobetwosituationswhere  congressionalexerciseoffederalcriminaljurisdictionisclearlywarrantedcaseswherethe  states,althoughcapable,areunwillingtoengagethemachineryoftheirowndomesticcriminal x laworwhenlocallawenforcementisincapableofhandlingaproblemnationalinscope.Civil d rightsprotectionandpoliticalcorruptionmightbeexamplesoftheformer,whileprotectionof P  nationalmarketsandorganizedcrimerepresentactivitiesinthelattercategory.)  ($USUS.,    119    _ԀSeeRedish&Drizin,ConstitutionalFederalismandJudicialReview:TheRoleof  TextualAnalysis,62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1,41(1987). ($USUS.,    120    _ԀTheFederalistNo.45,at292293(J.Madison)(C.Rossitered.1961).  ($USUS.,    121    _ԀSeeRailwayLaborExecutivesAssn.v.Gibbons,455U.S.457,468469(1982).  Cert.Denied455US999,102S.Ct.162971L.Ed.2d865;1982. S ($USUS.,    122    _ԀMemorandumIV,Section4clearlyprovidesthat"(t)heUnitedStatesshall...protect  eachof(thestates)againstInvasion;andontheApplicationoftheLegislature,orofthe  Executive(whentheLegislaturecannotbeconvened)againstdomesticViolence."Thus,the  federalinterventionremainslimitedincaseofviolencewithinastate,unlessofcoursethestate t requestsit.ThisDomesticViolenceClausecoverednotonlypoliticalviolencewithinthestate ` (suchasinsurrections),butalsocommoncriminalviolenceagainststatecitizens(suchasmurder, L  arson,androbbery).SeealsoU.S.Const.art.I,s.8,cl.6(powertopunishcounterfeitingof 8  UnitedStatessecuritiesandcoin);id.cl.10(powerto"punishPiraciesandFeloniescommitted $ t onthehighSeasandOffencesagainsttheLawofNations");id.cl.17(plenarypoweroverseat  ` offederalgovernmentandfederalenclaves);id.art.III,s.3(powertopunishtreason);Bybee,  L  InsuringDomesticTranquility:Lopez,FederalizationofCrime,andtheForgottenRoleofthe  8  DomesticViolenceClause,66 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1(1997)(arguingthattheClausesuppliesan $  independentjustificationforreininginCongresssattemptstofederalizestateviolentcrimes). ` ($USUS.,    123    _ԀSeeW.Rawle,AViewoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica299(2d  ed.1829);3J.Story,CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesp1819,at684685  (1833ed.)(Fred.B.Rothman&Co.1991);Bybee,InsuringDomesticTranquility:Lopez,  FederalizationofCrime , andtheForgottenRoleoftheDomesticViolenceClause , 66 Geo. t Wash.L.Rev. 1,34(1997). ($USUS.,    124    _ԀSeeR.Berger,Federalism:TheFoundersDesign ($USUS.,    125    _ԀL;pezat561562. & ($USUS.,    126    _ԀSeeNelson&Pushaw,RethinkingtheCommerceClause:ApplyingFirstPrinciples  toUpholdFederalCommercialRegulationsButPreserveStateControlOverSocialIssues,  85 IowaL.Rev. 1(1999)( Inourview,theCommerceClausedoesnotauthorizeenactmentofa  generalcriminalcodebecausemostcriminalbehaviordoesnotconstitute"commerce"the x voluntarysaleorexchangeofpropertyorservices.Atitscoreisaconsensualtransaction. d  Unilateralcriminalacts,nomatterhowsubstantialtheireconomicmotivation,arenot   commercial.) z ($USUS.,    127    _ԀId.at559. z ($USUS.,    128    _ԀId.at562. ($USUS.,    129    _ԀSeeL;pez,514U.S.at562563;Wirtz,392U.S.at192193;Darby,312U.S.at120  121.  ($USUS.,    130    _ԀL;pez,514U.S.at567(quotingA.L.A.SchechterPoultryCorp.v.UnitedStates,295  U.S.495,554(1935)(Cardozo,J.,concurring)). ($USUS.,    131    _ԀId.at566568;seealso,e.g.,Jones&Laughlin,301U.S.at30.  ($USUS.,    132    _ԀSee,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Pranno,385F.2d387,390(7thCir.1967)(extorting  $16,000fortheissuanceofabuildingpermit);UnitedStatesv.Provenzano,334F.2d678,683  (3dCir.1964)(extorting$17,000overaperiodofsevenyearstoavoidlabordisruptions);United  Statesv.Postma,242F.2d488,49192(3dCir.1957)(extorting$10,000toendaunionstrike); t UnitedStatesv.Dale,223F.2d181,182(7thCir.1955)(involvingattemptedextortionofatotal ` of$1,037,500onaconstructionproject);Callananv.UnitedStates,223F.2d171,173(8thCir. L  1955)(extorting$28,000forlaborpeaceduringtheconstructionofaninterstatepipeline);United 8  Statesv.Varlack,225F.2d665,66769(2dCir.1955)(involvingapproximately$11,000andan $ t initialdemandthatthevictims"giveeachofus$2,500and...aChevroletcar,andthatyouplace  ` eachofusonthepayrollat$50aweek").  ($USUS.,    133    _ԀSeeUnitedStatesv.Iigo,925F.2d641,649(3dCir.1991);UnitedStatesv.Cerilli,  603F.2d415,424(3dCir.1979)cert.denied444US1043,100S.Ct.728,62L.Ed.2d728,  1980;UnitedStatesv.Addonizio,451F.2d49,60(3dCir.1972);UnitedStatesv.Auguello,451  F.2d1167,1170(2dCir.1971)cert.denied405US1070,92S.Ct.151831L.Ed2d802,1972; t UnitedStatesv.Esperti,406F.2d148,150(5thCir.1969)cert.denied304US1000,89S.Ct. ` 1951,1969.SeealsoExpansion,supranote14,at314.  ($USUS.,    134    _SeeAddonizio,451F.2dat7677(citingStironev.UnitedStates,361U.S.212,215  (1960);UnitedStatesv.Tropiano,418F.2d1069,1076(2dCir.1969),cert.denied397US  1021,90S.Ct.1262,25L.Ed.2d530;Amabile,395F.2dat49;UnitedStatesv.Varlack,225   F.2d665,672(2dCir.1955);_Hulahan_,214F.2dat445;Nickv.UnitedStates,122F.2d660,  673(8thCir.)Cert.denied314US687,1941. w ($USUS.,    135    _Ԁ40F.3dat99100(citingUnitedStatesv.Merolla,523F.2d51(2ndCir.1975),and  UnitedStatesv.DeParias,805F.2d1447(11thCir.1986)).Cert.denied482US916,107S.Ct.  3189,96L.Ed.2d6781987. x ($USUS.,    136    _Ԁ40F.3dat100. ($USUS.,    137    _ԀWang,2000WL1060375,intextbelongingtoheadnote2. ($USUS.,    138    _ԀWang,2000WL1060375,intextbelongingtoheadnote3. ($USUS.,    139    _ԀWang,2000WL1060375,intextbelongingtoheadnote7.  ($USUS.,    140    _ԀHowever,severalcourtsstillupheldapplicationoftheHobbsActtotheftorextortion  fromsmallbusinessesonthegroundsthatstolenmoneyotherwisemighthavebeenspentin  interstatecommerce.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Zeigler,19F.3d486,491493(10thCir.),cert.  denied,513U.S.1003(1994);UnitedStatesv.Boston,718F.2d1511,15161517(10thCir. t 1983),cert.denied,466U.S.974(1984);UnitedStatesv.Elders,569F.2d1020,1025(7thCir. ` 1978). G ($USUS.,    141    _ԀCollins,95F.3dat100101(citingUnitedStatesv.Hanigan,681F.2d1127,1130(9th  Cir.1982),cert.denied,459U.S.1203,103S.Ct.1189,75L.Ed.2d435(1983);UnitedStatesv.  Lopez,2F.3d1342,1361(5thCir.1993),cert.granted,U.S.,114S.Ct.1536,128L.Ed.2d  189(1994),(citingWickardv.Filburn,317U.S.111,125,63S.Ct.82,87L.Ed.122(1942))) ($USUS.,    142    _ԀWang,2000WL1060375,intextbelongingtoheadnote4. !USUS.,  _     @U U INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT  @< < FORTHEDISTRICTOFPUERTORICO  A`,)dR6EAUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA h    `   Plaintiff,    h     CRIMINALNO.00000 L     `     h       vs. `     h     `    `     h      p DEFENDANT,  $    Defendant.   A`,)0dR6E0A @) ) MOTIONTODISMISSFORLACKOFJURISDICTION  p HON.CARMENC.CEREZO H UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTJUDGE 4 FORTHEDISTRICTOFPUERTORICO  p   COMESNOW,thedefendant_Defendant_,representedbytheFederalPublicDefender,and H respectfullySTATESandPRAYS:   @  I.FACTUALBACKGROUND     Mr.Defendantstandschargedofvariousoffences,themostsignificantofthembrought  beforethisCourtundertheHobbsAct. %   1      ׀CountsoneandtwooftheIndictmentrefertothedeathof X  Mr.duringarobberyathishome,inPonce,PuertoRico,inwhichapproximately$500.00 0"  werestolenandwhichallegedlyweretheproceedsfromagasolinestationinPeuelas,PuertoRico. $X"   The jurisdictionalhooktoprosecutethiseventsintheFederalforumisanallegationthat  therobberyofthatmoneyaffectedtheinterstatecommerceandthusviolatedthe_Hobbs_ԀAct,18   U.S.C.1951. t    Ifthemoneywasindeedstolenisuncertainfromtheevidenceproducedindiscoverysofar L  bytheUnitedStates.Onthepolicereportoftheofficerrespondingtotheemergency,datedJuly9, $` 1997,itisstatedthatnopropertywasstolen.Cooperatingcodefendant,hasstatedthatno 8  moneywasstolenfromthehouseofMr..Ontheotherhand,twoyearsafterthefacts,on   October14,1999,andafterbeinginterviewedbytheFBI,thesonofthevictimallegedthatsome   money(approximately$500)had disappeared.Notwithstandingthisdiscrepancy,whichultimately  isanissuefortheJury,thisMotionapproachesthesubjectassumingthatthe$500.00wereindeed \ stolen. 4p   Aswillbediscussedbelow,defendantcontendsthatthisCourtlacksjurisdictionoverCounts  H OneandTwooftheIndictment,sincetheHobbsActwasnotviolated.Thecentralissuewillbeif   underUnitedStatesv.Lopez, %   2      ׀anditsprogeny,Section1951(a)appliestorobberydirectedagainst  privateindividualintheirhomes. !  (Eh83 @l l II. INTRODUCTION:HOBBSANDL:PEZ    (0!$ _  In1947,the_Hobbs_ԀActamendedtheAntiRacketeeringActof1934. %   3      ׀Theamendment   soughttobroaden,undertheCommerceClause,thefederalgovernmentscapacitytoprosecutethe   interstateactivitiesofgangsters.WiththeActCongressalsowantedtoensurethatthetrafficin t  interstatehighwaysduringlaborstrikesremainedunimpeded.Itjustifiedthisinterventioninstate L  affairsbasedonthefactthatthetypeofcriminalactivitytargetedcrossedstatelines.Also, $` accordingtothelegislativehistory,localandstateauthoritiesappearedincompetentindealingwith 8  suchcrimes,andthusprotectingtheintegrityofanationalmarket.| %   4           In1995,theSupremeCourtdecidedUnitedStatesv._L;pez_0 %   5      ,inwhichtheGunFreeSchool   ZonesActwasfoundconstitutionallylacking,sinceitcriminalizedconductbeyondthepermissible  undertheCommerceClauseoftheConstitution.ThecaseaimedtoremindCongressthatAmerican \ federalauthorityrestsonenumeratedpowers.Thejudiciarymustintervenetoannulfederal 4p legislationunderthecommercepowerthatalterssignificantlythebalancebetweenfederalandstate  H responsibilities.Accordingto_L;pez_,whereastatute"_define[s_]asafederalcrimeconductreadily   denouncedascriminalbytheStates"  %   6      ,fundamentalprinciplesoffederalismrequirethat unless  Congressconveysitspurposeclearly,itwillnotbedeemedtohavesignificantlychangedthefederal  statebalancebyfederalizinglocalcrimes.  %   7      ׀Thus,under_L;pez_Ԁrationale,asdevelopedbyits   progeny,the_Hobbs_ԀActisaquestionableexerciseofcongressionalauthorityasaproperfederal t  interventioninstatematters. L  e XThereasoningbecameknownas_L;pez_s firstprinciplesoffederalism.Itarguesthatthe $` Constitution"_withhold[s_]fromCongressaplenarypolicepowerthatwouldauthorizeenactmentof 8  everytypeoflegislation."Clearlythefoundingfatherscreateda FederalGovernmentofenumerated   powers."  %   8      ׀This"enumeration"necessarily"presupposessomethingnotenumerated,"$8 %   9      ׀namely,the   rightsofthepeople.Iffederalprosecutorscoulduseasweepingfederalcriminalstatutetoprosecute  crimeswithinthelocaljurisdictionofthestates,& %   10      ׀the firstprinciplesoffederalismenunciatedin \ _L;pez_anditsprogenywouldbecomemeaningless.Sincerobberystandsasoneoftheoldest 4p commonlawcrimes,theprosecutionofrobberyshouldremainastatematter,outsidethescopeof  the_Hobbs_ԀAct.   @77! III.THE_HOBBS_ԀACT  t   A. ` LegislativeHistory  L  Section1951(a),knownasthe _Hobbs_ԀAct,becamelawin1947.ItsupplantedtheAnti $` RacketeeringActof1934,* %   11      ׀whichCongresspassedtocurve rackets,thatis,exactingbusinesses 8  moneyforprotection;thevery activitiesofpredatorycriminalgangsoftheKellyand_Dillinger_   types.+| %   12      ׀TheActappearedspecificallyinresponsetothecaseholdinginUnitedStatesv.Local807,   InternationalBrotherhoodofTeamsters" %   13      ,inwhichtheSupremeCourtreversedtheconvictionsof  teamsterslocalsaccusedof racketeering_(  %   14      _.The racketoftheseunionmemberssupposedly \ consistedofpreventingtrucksfromenteringtheCityofNewYork,andforcingnonuniondriversto 4p paythe wagesauniondriverwouldhaveearnedhadtheunionallowedhimtocompletethe  delivery.- %   15      ׀   In1946,congressionaldebateoverthe_Hobbs_ԀActcenteredonthis laborexemptionofthe t  AntiRacketeeringAct.SomemembersofCongressquestionedwhethertheeliminationofthe L  exemptionwouldundulyinterferewithorganizedlaborsrights,suchastherighttostrikeandpicket. $` OthersinterpretedtheSupremeCourtholdingascreatingaloopholeinthelaw,thusineffect 8  legalizingtheuseofviolencetosolvelabormanagementdisputes..| %   16         The_Hobbs_ԀActappearedtocloseofftheloophole,thusmaking racketeeringafederalcrime   evenifcommittedinthenameoflaborrights./ %   17      ׀Congressfurthersoughttoensurethatthehighways  ininterstatecommerceremainedfreefrominterferenceduringlaborstrikes.0 %   18      ׀Butmostimportantly, \ Congressjustifiedfederalinterventionbecausestatelawsremainedinadequatetoattendthisissue. 4p AsdescribedinLocal807,thistypeofracketeeringcrossedstatelines,andinvolvedpolitically  H influentiallocalgroups,apparentlyimmunefromstateprosecution.1 %   19      ׀Tocorrecttheseperceived   insufficienciesinbothfederalandstatepractice,the_Hobbs_ԀActamendedthelanguageofsection3(a)   intheAntiRacketeeringAct.Thatsectionhaddefined fearforextortionpurposesasactsdone in ! _violationofthecriminallawsoftheUnitedStates.2 %   20      ׀Thenewlanguagesoughttoprovidegreater   federallatitude,notonlytoprosecutegangsterismand rackets,buttoeradicateabroaderarrayof   corruptpracticesatstatelevel.3h %   21      ׀First,inadditiontoextortion,thenewversionexpandeditscoverage t  toinclude robbery.Second,itdeleted4oftheAntiRacketeeringAct,toavoidtherequirement L  thateveryprosecutionmustinitiatesolely upontheexpressdirectionoftheAttorneyGeneral. $` CongressmanSamHobbsofAlabama,themajorsponsorofthebill,expressed: [extortion 8  androbbery]havebeenconstruedathousandtimesbythecourts.Everybodyknowswhatthey   mean."4 %   22      ׀AddedanotherCongressman: [thelanguageoftheAntiRacketeeringActof1934]is too   general,andwe[think]itbettertomakethisbill[HobbsAct]explicit.5  %   23      ׀Thus,theintentofCongress  inpassingtheAntiRacketeeringActof1934remainedinplacewhenthenewstatutoryenactment d oftheHobbsActamendmentbecamelawin1947.6,  %   24      ׀ <x BoththehistoryoftheAntiRacketeeringActandtheHobbsAct,interpretedtogether,show P thatCongresssoughttoenablethegovernmenttoprosecutethatspeciesofrobberyandviolence ( whichapparentlylocallawenforcementremainedunabletopursuewithdiligenceduetoitsmulti  statenature,andtheabilityoflocalgangsterstoeludeprosecutionbystateofficials.    B. ` TheTextofSection1951(a)  t  ThetextofSection1951(a)purportstoreachonlyrobberythat inanywayordegree L  obstructs,delays,oraffects[interstate]commerceorthemovementofanyarticleorcommodityin $` [interstate]commerce.7 %   25      ׀Clearly,thenexuswithinterstatecommercebecomesaseparateelement 8  ofthecrime,meaningthatproofofsuchnexusmustalwaysexistineverycase.8| %   26         TocorrectlyinterpretthejurisdictionalphraseinSection1951(a)courtsshouldfollowthe    ordinaryandnaturalmeaningofthetermsemployedinthestatute.;0 %   27      ׀GiventhattheCourthas  upheldtheconstitutionalityoftheHobbsActundertheCommerceClause,sayingthatthestatute is \ directedattheprotectionofinterstatecommerce,: %   28      ׀aninterpretationofthetextofSection1951(a) 4p mustaccordinglyadoptatwoprongapproach:first,decidewhetheraparticularrobberycomes  H directedtowardacommercialestablishmentoraprivateindividual,andsecond,howthiscriminal    actactuallyaffectedinterstatecommerce.  PreLopezcasesheldthatrobberiesofcommercialestablishmentsneededonlyproofofa de  minimiseffectoninterstatecommercetosatisfythejurisdictionalelementoftheHobbsAct.B %   29      ׀The    questionafterL;pezbecomeswhethertheActremainsconstitutionallyvalidinnoncommercial t  settingswithonlya deminimisrequirement.Althoughthetrendappearschanging,C@ %   30      ׀mostcircuit L  courtsstillassumethat,inthecontextofrobberyofcommercialestablishments,the deminimis $` effectsufficesunderL;peztomaketheHobbsActapermissibleexerciseofcongressionalpowerto 8  regulatecommerceamongthestates.D %   31      ׀Suchtestappearsphrasedasfollows:   8 ` [I]nHobbsActprosecutionsbasedonlocalactivitiesthataffect   interstatecommerce,thegovernmentneednotprovethattheeffectof   anindividualdefendantsconductwassubstantial.Itsufficestoshow  aslighteffectineachcase,providedthatthedefendantsconductisof p ageneraltypewhich,viewedintheaggregate,affectsinterstate \  commercesubstantially.E %   32      H` `  Thecircuitcourtcasesthatsoheld,nevertheless,dealtonlywithrobberydirectedat   commercialestablishments,notprivateindividuals.F %   33      ׀Fornoncommercialrobbery,courtshave   requiredamorestringenttestandhaveturnedtothe depletionofassetstheory,discussedindetail t  below,whichholdsthatthegovernmenthastodemonstratethatarobbery depletedtheassetsof L  anindividualoranentitycustomarilyengagedininterstatecommerce.Therobberyhastohave $` impairedordelayedtheabilityoftheindividualorentitytoparticipateininterstatecommerce.Gh %   34       8  Otherwise,thenoncommercialrobberyofanindividualstandstooremotefrominterstatecommerce   towarrantfederaljurisdictionunderHobbs.   Evenincasesthatstillusea deminimistesttovalidateHobbsActprosecutionsin  commercialcontexts,courtshaverecognizedthatthetermsofSection1951(a)imposeatleastsome \ limitstoCongressspowerundertheCommerceClause.H %   35      ׀Followingtheordinaryandnatural 4p meaningoftheseterms,thejurisdictionallanguageoftheHobbsActencompassesonlycriminalacts  H thatdirectlyor concretelyaffectinterstatecommercialenterprises.I %   36      ׀Moreover,Section1951(a)   usesthephrase, affect[][interstate]commerce,J\  %   37      ׀andCongresshasusedthesameorsimilar  jurisdictionalinmanyotherstatutestolimitfederalregulationofintrastateconduct,theusageinthose  otherstatutesshouldprovidepersuasiveevidenceofthecontextforconstruingthelimitingtermsof   Section1951(a).K( %   38       t  WhenCongresshasusedthephraseappliedtoanactivitythat affectsinterstatecommerce L  inotherareas,italwayshasdonesoinreferencetocommercialorbusinessrelatedactivities.For $` instance,inJonesv.UnitesStates,L %   39      ׀theSupremeCourtinterpretedtheArsonprohibitionofSection 8  844(i)of18U.S.C,toextendonlytoactivities whichaffect[]interstateorforeigncommerce.Mh %   40      ׀As   theSupremeCourtinapostL;pezcaserecognized, [t]he affect[]commercetestwasdeveloped   ...todefinetheextentofCongressspoweroverpurelyintrastatecommercialactivitiesthat  nonethelesshavesubstantialinterstateeffects.N %   41      ׀Theseusagesofthephrase affect[]interstate   commerceprovidecompellingevidencethatSection1951(a)shouldreflectasimilarunderstanding t  ofthesecommonstatutoryterms,tomeanapplicationtopurposefulbusinessor commercial L  activities. $` Thusinterpreted,thejurisdictionalelementinSection1951(a)wouldservetosingleout 8  intrastaterobberieswithsufficientconnectionstointerstatecommerce,tobecomepermissibleobjects   offederalcriminalintervention,anddistinguishthemfromrobberiesthataffectpurelyprivate,non   commercialinterests.Yetthisinterpretationwouldrequiredelimitingnoncommercialrobberiesthat   inanywayordegree...affect[][interstate]commercetothosethat substantiallyaffectinterstate \ commerce.Oh %   42      ׀TointerpretSection1951(a)asreachingindividualpersonsinprivateresidencesor 4p othernoncommercialstructureswouldhavethepracticaleffectofeliminatingthe interstate  H commerceelementoftheHobbsAct,giventherealitythattodayanypersonorpropertyhasatleast   some deminimislinktointerstatecommerce.   C.TheSupremeCourtCases !  InUnitedStatesv.Green,Stironev.UnitedStates,andUnitedStatesv.Culbert,Q %   43      ׀the l#  SupremeCourtinterpretedinitiallyabroadsweepfortheHobbsAct. D%  InGreen,R %   44      ׀theCourtexplainedthattheActprohibitedeverytypeofviolence,evenwhen   committedbyworkersinthecontextoflabordisputes.Thedistrictcourtthatsawthecaseinthefirst   instancehadconcludedthatemployeesmerelyappearedexercisingtheirrightstopressurean t  employer,eveninfusingthreatsofviolence.S| %   45      ׀OnAppeal,theSupremeCourtdisagreed,andpointed L  outthatthelegislativehistoryoftheHobbsActmadeitveryclearthat attemptstogetpersonal $` propertythroughthreatsofforceorviolenceappearedastheverytypeoflaborconductthat [t]he 8  HobbsActwasmeanttostop...TheCourtinterpretedthatsincetheActappeareddirectedtowards   the protectionofinterstatecommerceagainstinjuryfromextortion,...[all]racketeeringaffecting   interstatecommerce[includinglaborviolence]waswithinfederallegislativecontrol.T0 %   46        InStironethegovernmenthadindictedaworkerfor allegedlymakingthreatstodisruptthe \ constructionofasteelmill.Inthegovernmentscase,thesandusedtomixtheconcretetobuildthe <x millcamefromoutsidetheState,andthatfactualelementsupposedlyprovidedthebasisforfederal P jurisdictionoverthematter.Theindictmentchargedthatinterstatecommercewouldgetdisruptedby ( interferencewith sandshipmentsintoPennsylvania.Stirone,361U.S.at21415.TheSupreme  Courtagreed,andinadictum,V %   47      ׀interpretedthe [Hobbs]Act[to]speak[]inbroadlanguage, ! manifestingapurposetousealltheconstitutionalpowerCongresshastopunishinterferencewith  interstatecommercebyextortion,robbery,orphysicalviolence.TheActoutlawsinterference inany   wayordegree.W  %   48       t  ThisexpansivetrendwasslowedinStirone,whichwarnedthathoweverbroad,theHobbs L  Actestablishedlimitstofederaljurisdictionintheverylanguageofthestatute. [T]herearetwo $` essentialelementsofaHobbsActcrimesaidtheCourt, interferencewithcommerce,andextortion. 8  Bothelementshavetobecharged.Neitherissurplusageandneithercanbetreatedassurplusage.   ThechargethatinterstatecommerceisaffectediscriticalsincetheFederalGovernmentsjurisdiction   ofthiscrimerestsonlyonthatinterference.X|  %   49        InCulbert,theCourtreaffirmedStironeastotheextensionoftheAct.Bythen,ithadbecome \ clearthatHobbscoveredmorethanmere racketeering.CitingStirone,theCulbertCourtstated: 4p 8 ` [T]hestatutorylanguagesweepswithinitallpersonswhohave inany  H wayordegree...affect[ed]commerce...byrobberyorextortion.These 4 wordsdonotlendthemselvestorestrictiveinterpretation;aswehave    recognized,they manifest...apurposetouseallthe_constitutional   powerCongresshastopunishinterferencewithinterstatecommerce  byextortion,robberyorphysicalviolence,!  !hbus  ` `      But_Culbert_alsoconsideredthe federalstatebalanceintheapplicationofthe_Hobbs_ԀAct.   TheCourtcitedlaxandineffectivestateenforcementasthemainreasonsforfederalizinglocal `  crimes.SaidtheCourt: 8t 8 ` Withregardtotheconcernaboutdisturbingthefederalstatebalance, L  moreover,thereisnoquestionthatCongressintendedtodefineasa 8  federalcrimeconductthatitknewwaspunishableunderstatelaw. $  Thelegislativedebatesarerepletewithstatementsthattheconduct   punishableunderthe_Hobbs_ԀActwasalreadypunishableunderstate   robberyandextortionstatutes.ThosewhoopposedtheActargued   thatitwasagraveinterferencewiththerightsofStates.Congress   apparentlybelieved,however,thattheStateshadnotbeeneffectively  prosecutingrobberyandextortionaffectinginterstatecommerceand p theFederalGovernmenthadanobligationtodoso.\` `   H 8 ` Inconclusion,boththelegislativehistoryofthe_Hobbs_ԀAct,andthe 4p SupremeCourtcasesdiscussedabove,makeclearthatCongressnever  \ intendedtofederalize robberyassuch,regardlessofthecrimes  H connectiontointerstatecommerce.4` `     jFederalprosecutorsagreedwiththisinterpretationinitially.Thus,the_Hobbs_ԀActcameto   attack thetypicalracketeeringactivitiesaffectinginterstatecommerce[suchas]thoseinconnection    withpricefixingandeconomicextortiondirectedbyprofessionalgangsters, %   50      ׀aswellasillegallabor " _practices. %   51      ׀Onlylater,asconcernsforfederalismwaned,federalprosecutorsextendedthereachof   theHobbsActfurtherthantheConstitutionallows.Thus,inUnitedStatesv.L;pez,  %   52      ׀theSupreme   CourthadtoremindbothCongress,andtheExecutiveBranch,ofthelimitationstofederal  involvementwithintrastatematters.    @IV.THECOMMERCECLAUSEBEFOREANDAFTERLOPEZ  t   A. ` ABriefHistory ofitsDevelopmentandReach  L  TheHobbsActisanactofCongress,actingundertheauthorityoftheCommerceClause. ,h Congresshastheconstitutionalauthority"[t]oregulate[c]ommerce...amongtheseveralStates,"and @  toenactsuchlawsasitdeems"necessaryandproper"fortheprotectionofanationalcommerce. %   53         Indeed,theCommerceClausehasremained oneofthemostprolificsourcesofnationalpower.  %   54         Itadmittedly grantsCongressextensivepowerandamplediscretiontodetermineitsappropriate   exercise.D  %   55       d Duringthenineteenthcenturycongressionalfacultyovercommerceremainedverymuch  circumscribed.InUnitedStatesv.E.C.KnightCo., %   56      ׀andmuchlater,inCarterv.CarterCoalCo.| %   57      ,    theCourtrestrictedcongressionalauthorityandexcluded mining, production,and manufacture t  fromthescopeofthecommerceclause.Itplacedtheseactivitiesoutsidecongressionalreachby L  definingthemas noncommercial.In,Hammerv.Dagenhart0 %   58      ׀theSupremeCourtonceagain $` limitedcongressionalcontrolofintrastateoperationsofbusinesses.Itheldthatthefederalgovernment 8  hadnopowertoprohibittheinterstatetransportofgoodsmadebychildlabor.In1935,A.L.A.   SchecterPoultryCorp.v.UnitedStates  %   59      ׀ruledthatCongresscouldregulatecommercialactivities    directly,buthadtoavoidinterferingwithsuchactivities indirectly.In1937,NLRBv.Jones&  LaughlinSteelCorp.H  %   60      upheldtheNationalLaborRelationsAct.TheCourtabandonedthecategories \ of directand indirecteffectsoncommerce,andthusallowedcongressionalregulationofactivities 4p  moreremovedfrominterstatecommerce.In1941,UnitedStatesv.Darby  %   61      ׀explicitlyoverturned  H SchecterPoultry,andupheldtheFairLaborStandardsAct.Thus,afederallymandatedwageand  hour remunerationforemployeesbecamenationallaw.    Then,in1942,cameWickardv.Filburn %   62      ׀whichfirstformulatedthe aggregationprinciple. |  TheCourtreasonedthatevenwhenanactivity,standingalone,couldhavelittleeffectoncommerce, T  itneverthelessremainedwithinthescopeoffederalregulationwhenthe contribution,takentogether ,h withthatofmanyother[][activities]...isfarfromtrivial.| %   63      ׀Theapplicationoftheaggregation @  principleallowedfederalcourtstofindasufficientjurisdictionalnexusundertheCommerceClause   byaddingupthediscreeteffectsoninterstatecommerceofparticularintrastatecommercialcrimes.   Butin1995,UnitedStatesv.L;pezquestionedthis aggregationpracticetoestablishfederal  jurisdiction,particularlyinnoncommercialcases. %   64      ׀L;pezemphasizedthatAmericanfederal d  authorityrestsonenumeratedpowers.Althoughdefinitelynotcounselingareturntoa horseand_Ԅ <x buggydefinitionofinterstatecommerce, %   65      ׀thecase vividlyremindsus[that]...thejudiciarymust   intercedetoassurethatCongressdoesnot,byenactingunconstitutionallegislationundertheguise   ofthecommercepower,dramaticallyalterthebalanceoffederalism.  %   66       t   B._L;pez_sThreeCategoriesofCommercialActivities L   In1990,CongresslegislatedtheGunFreeSchoolZonesAct,4 %   67      ׀tomakeitafederalcrimeto $` possessafirearminthevicinityofaschool.DefendantAlfonso_L;pez_,Jr.,ahighschoolstudentin 8  SanAntonio,Texas,becamechargedwithcarryingahandgunandfivebulletstoschool.The    SupremeCourtaffirmedtheFifthCircuitCourtreversaloftheconviction, %   68      ׀andestablishedwhat   _becameknownas firstprinciplesoffederalism.Thecasereaffirmed %   69      ׀the threebroadcategories  ofactivitythatCongresscouldconstitutionallyregulateunderthecommercepower.| %   70          Firstly,Congressmaylegislate tokeepthechannelsofinterstatecommercefreefrom t  immoralandinjurioususes....0 %   71      ׀Secondly,Congresscanregulate theinstrumentalitiesofinterstate L  commerce,orpersonsorthingsininterstatecommerce. %   72      ׀Thirdly,Congresshasthepower to $` regulatethoseactivitieshavingasubstantialrelationtointerstatecommerce,i.e.,thoseactivitiesthat 8  substantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce. %   73         Theseformalcategoriesbecomeirrelevant,however,wheneverCongressdirectlyregulates   acommercial8  %   74      ׀enterprise,oranentityengagedininterstatecommerce.  %   75      ׀But,theSupremeCourtin  L;pezmadeclearthatundernocircumstancesshoulda relativelytrivialeffectoninterstate \  commerceprovidethepretextfora broadgeneralregulationofstateorprivateactivities. %   76      ׀_In 4p _L;pez_,theGunFreeSchoolZonesActfellwithinthethirdcategory,asanactivitythatsubstantially  affectsinterstatecommerce;thestatuteneverthelessremainedconstitutionallylackingbecause: %   77          a)Thecriminalactsinquestionhad nothingtodowithcommerceoranysortofeconomic t  activity,howeverbroadlyonemightdefinethoseterms.| %   78      ׀Sincethepossessionofagunneara L  schoolhadnodemonstrableeffectoncommerce,Congresshadunconstitutionallyconcludedthatthe $` activity viewedintheaggregate,substantiallyaffectedinterstatecommerce,wheninfactitdid 8  not.0 %   79         b)TheGunFreeSchoolZonesAct,hadnoexpressjurisdictionalelementwhichwouldhave    _ensure[d_],throughcasebycaseinquirythatthe[criminalactivity]inquestion_affect[ed_]interstate  commerce. %   80       \ c)Finally,theGunFreeSchoolZonesActhadnolegislativehistoryonpoint,illuminating 4p Congressrationaleonhowgunpossessioninschoolzones substantiallyaffectedinterstate  H commerce. %   81      ׀Thoughusuallynotrequired,legislativehistorybecomesimportant,accordingtothe   Court,whenthe ...substantialeffect[uponinterstatecommerceis]notvisibletothenakedeye...L  %   82         C.The_L;pez_ԀProgeny  ! Mostrecently,UnitedStatesv.Morrison %   83      andDeweyJonesv.UnitedStates,| %   84      ׀reaffirmedthe  _L;pez_initiatedmovementagainstfederalizationofintrastatecriminalactivities.   InMorrison,aformeruniversitystudentbroughtsuitundertheViolenceAgainstWomenAct t  (_VAWA_)0 %   85      ׀againstherfellowstudentsforallegedlyrapingher.TheSupremeCourtdeclaredthe L  _VAWA_ԀunconstitutionalforthispurposeaccordingtotheCourt,Congresslackedtheauthorityunder $` boththeCommerceClauseandsection5oftheFourteenthAmendment,toenactafederalcivil 8  remedyprovisionfor_VAWA_.Morrisonreaffirmsthecontinuedvitalityofthe substantialeffect   testenunciatedin_L;pez_,andallbutrejectsthe aggregationprincipleoutsidethe commercial   sphere.SaysMorrison,echoing_L;pez_:  8 ` InLopez,weheldthattheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990,18 \ U.S.C.922(q)(1)(A),whichmadeitafederalcrimetoknowingly H possessafirearminaschoolzone,exceededCongressauthorityunder 4p theCommerceClause...Severalsignificantconsiderationscontributed  \ toourdecision.First,weobservedthat922(q)was acriminal  H statutethatbyitstermshasnothingtodowith commerceoranysort 4 ofeconomicenterprise,however broadlyonemightdefinethose   terms....Reviewingourcaselaw,wenotedthat wehaveuphelda  widevarietyofcongressionalActsregulatingintrastateeconomic  activitywherewehaveconcludedthattheactivitysubstantially   affectedinterstatecommerce....[_W]e_Ԁstatedthatthepatternofanalysis ! isclear[:]...Whereeconomicactivitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstate " commerce,legislationregulatingthatactivitywillbesustained. %   86       p# Furthermore,Morrisonhighlightsthestrictly commercialnatureof \$ theactivitiestowhichCongressspowercouldconceivablyextend. H%  SaysMorrison: LopezsreviewofCommerceClausecaselaw 4&p! demonstratesthatinthosecaseswherewehavesustainedfederal  regulationofintrastateactivitybasedupontheactivityssubstantial  effectsoninterstatecommerce,theactivityinquestionhasbeensome   sortofeconomicendeavor. %   87       ` `   t  ١Forsimilarreasons,Morrisonseverelyquestionstheuseofthe aggregationprincipleto `  obtainfederaljurisdictionovernoncommercialcases.| %   88      ׀ThisparticularMorrisonreasoningbecomes 8t acutelyrelevantinthecaseofrobberiesdirectedtowardprivateindividualsintheirhomes,sincein L  thesecasesthelinkwithinterstatecommercealwaysappearshighlyattenuatedornonexistent. $  InJonesv.UnitedStates,0 %   89      ׀theCourtrefusedtoextendthefederalarsonstatute, %   90      ׀tocoverthe   fireofaprivateresidenceusedforeverydayfamilyliving.Thestatutepenalizeswhoever    maliciously_damag[es_]or_destro[ys_],...bymeansoffireoranexplosive,anybuilding...usedin p interstateorforeigncommerceorinanyactivityaffectinginterstateorforeigncommerce.Jones H stoodaccusedandconvictedoftossingaMolotovcocktailintohiscousinshome.TheSupreme  \ Courtconcludesthatthephrase usedincommerceexcludesowneroccupiedresidences,withno 4 commercialuse.Thus,Jonescrimeofsettingfiretohiscousinshometriggerednofederal   involvementunder844(_i_)of18U.S.C. %   91         InJones,federalprosecutorswantedtheCourttoaccepttheinterpretationthatthevictimhad "  usedhisresidencetoobtainamortgageloanfromastatelender.Thelenderinturn, usedthe X$ propertyassecurityfortheloan.Furthermore,thehomeownerhad usedtheresidencetoobtaina  casualtyinsurancepolicyonthepropertyfromaaninsurerinanotherstate.Thirdly,thehomeowner    usedhisresidencetoreceivenaturalgasfromsourcesoutsidethestate.Thus,thegovernment t  wantedtheCourttoconcludethat,sincetheprivateresidenceintowhichJonesthrewtheMolotov L  cocktailengagedinthesethree _activit[ies_]affectingcommerce,federaljurisdictionensued. %   92      ׀The $` SupremeCourtdisagreed,andconcluded: 8  8 ` Itsurelyisnotthecommonperceptionthataprivate,owneroccupied   residenceis"used"inthe"activity"ofreceivingnaturalgas,a   mortgage,oraninsurancepolicy...TheGovernmentdoesnotallege   thattheIndianaresidenceinvolvedinthiscaseservedasahomeoffice   orthelocusofanycommercialundertaking.Thehomesonly"active  employment,"sofarastherecordreveals,wasfortheeverydayliving p ofJonesscousinandhisfamily...WerewetoadopttheGovernments \ expansiveinterpretationof844(_i_),hardlyabuildingintheland H wouldfalloutsidethefederalstatutesdomain.Practicallyevery 4p buildinginourcities,towns,andruralareasisconstructedwith  \ suppliesthathavemovedininterstatecommerce,servedbyutilities  H thathaveaninterstateconnection,financedorinsuredbyenterprises 4 thatdobusinessacrossstatelines,orbearssomeothertraceof   interstatecommerce.| %   93       ` `    Asfor_L;pez_,theCourtexpressed:    ! 8 ` GiventheconcernsbroughttotheforeinLopez,itisappropriateto " avoidtheconstitutionalquestionthatwouldarisewerewetoread l# 844(_i_)torenderthe"traditionallylocalcriminalconduct"inwhich X$ petitionerJonesengaged"amatterforfederalenforcement."0 %   94      D% ` `    0&l! Thus,MorrisonandJonesdemonstratethatthegovernmentsoldargumentsinfavorofan   expansivefederalcriminaljurisdictionundertheCommerceClauseopentoquestiontoday.    @ VI.THEAGGREGATIONTHEORY  t  EvenifthetextofSection1951(a)mandatednoperseexclusionofnoncommercialrobbery, L  courtswouldstillneedtoconsidertheapplicationofthe_Hobbs_ԀActtotheparticularcasebeforethem. $` Asageneralrule,theapplicationofthe_Hobbs_ԀActtotherobberyofaprivateindividualathome 8  violatestheCommerceClause.Theonlyexceptiontotherulecouldbecomeanoncommercial   robberywheretheviolenttakingoftheindividualspersonalpropertywouldhavetoaffector   interferewithinterstatecommercebywayofanadverseconsequenceonthatindividualsorthe  companyspotentialforconductinginterstatebusiness.  \  Theconnectionsbetweentherobberyofaprivatepersonandinterstatecommerceappear 4p insubstantialenough.Someproponentsoffederalizationarguethatfederallawnevertheless  H proscribestheseactsbasedonthe aggregationprinciple.Usingthisprinciple,robberyappearsas   thetypeofactivitythatsosubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerceingeneral,thatanindividualized,  casebycaseinquiry,intoeachcasesnexuswithcommercebecomesunnecessary.Indeed,by ! concludingthatthefederalgovernmentcanregulateanyrobberywhatsoever,basedonthe l#  aggregatefinancialimpactofoncommerceofallrobberies,largeandsmall,thejurisdictional D%  elementofSection1951(a)becomessuperfluous. 'X" But_L;pez_anditsprogeny,especiallyMorrison,supra,andJones,supra,denouncethis (0!$ reasoningasflawed.Thecriminalactofrobberycanneversustaintheaggregationofitseffectin *#& ordertojustifybecomingtheobjectofafederalprohibitionwithoutasubstantialjurisdictionalnexus. ,$( Accordingto_L;pez_, the de_minimis_characterofindividualinstancesarisingunder[astatute  enactedundertheCommerceClause]isofnoconsequenceandsowillpermitfederalregulation   only whereageneralregulatorystatutebearsasubstantialrelationtocommerce. %   95       t  Ifafederalprohibitioncouldextendtoresidentialrobberysimplybecause,takentogether,all L  robberiespresentasignificantaggregateeffectoninterstatecommerce,thenalmostanyintrastate $` conductwouldfallunderfederalscrutinybyvirtueoftheinevitableinterconnectionofeverythingand 8  everyoneinaglobalizedeconomy.Suchreasoningrepresentsaviolationofoneofthemost   fundamentalpremisesofAmericanconstitutionalfederalism,namely,that [_t]he_Ԁ_interpenetrations_   ofmodernsocietyhavenotwipedoutstatelines.| %   96        Congresshasplenaryauthoritytoregulateinterstatecommerce.0 %   97      ׀Butwhenitcomesto \ intrastateconductthecommercepowerextendsonlytothoseactivities whichsoaffectinterstate 4p commerceortheexertionofthepowerofCongressoveritastomakeregulationofthemappropriate  H meanstotheattainmentofalegitimateend,theexerciseofthegrantedpowerofCongresstoregulate   interstatecommerce. %   98      ׀ThejustificationundertheCommerceClauseforthisfederalpowerremains   thus: ...thatincertainfactsituationsfederalregulationofpurelylocalandintrastatecommerce ! _maybenecessaryandpropertopreventinjurytointerstatecommerce. %   99      ׀Asrecognizedby   constitutionalscholars,, %   100      ׀the substantialeffectoncommercetestundertheNecessaryandProper   Clause %   101      ׀suggestssomethingmorethanamereaddingupofcosts. %   102      ׀AsL;pezmakesclear:the t   activitiesthatsubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce..[become]...activitieshavingasubstantial L  relationtointerstatecommerce.X %   103       $` Insomelimitedcircumstancesfederalinterventionwithintrastateconductmaybecome  necessary.Theaggregateeffectofaparticularclassofinsignificantactivitiescouldhaveasubstantial   impactoninterstatecommerce.Inthiscase,the substantialeffectwoulddefineintermsofits t  qualitativeclosenesstointerstatecommerce,ratherthanaquantitativeaggregationofeffects.Such L  appearsthecaseinUnitedStatesv.Harrington, %   104      ׀wherethecourtusedthestandardofa director $`  concreteeffectoncommerce,orinorinCollinsandWangwherethecourtsadopteda substantial 8  effectinsteadoftheusual deminimisstandard.   But transparentlyinsubstantialconnectionswithcommerce,suchastherobberyofan   individualathome,andthetakingofhispersonalproperty,appearsinsufficientbyitselftojustify  federalinterventionnomatterwhatthedollarvalue.AstheSupremeCourtrecentlyexplainedin d Morrison: <x Ӏ8 ` [O]urdecisioninLopezrestedinpartonthefactthatthelink P between[thecriminalactregulated]andasubstantialeffecton < interstatecommercewasattenuated....TheUnitedStatesarguedthat ( the[criminalact]mayleadtoviolentcrime,andthatviolentcrime   canbeexpectedtoaffectthefunctioningofthenationaleconomyin  twoways.First,thecostsofviolentcrimearesubstantial,and,   throughthemechanismofinsurance,thosecostsarespreadthroughout ! thepopulation.Second,violentcrimereducesthewillingnessof " individualstotraveltoareaswithinthecountrythatareperceivedto t# beunsafe....TheGovernmentalsoarguedthatthe[thecriminalact] `$ posesathreattothe[local]educationalprocess,whichinturn L%  threatenstoproducealessefficientandproductiveworkforce,which 8&t! willnegativelyaffectnationalproductivityandthusinterstate $'`" commerce...Werejectedthese costsofcrimeand national (L # productivityargumentsbecausetheywouldpermitCongressto (8!$  regulatenotonlyallviolentcrime,butallactivitiesthatmightleadto )$"% violentcrime,regardlessofhowtenuouslytheyrelatetointerstate *#& commerce....Wenotedthat,underthisbutforreasoning: Congress  couldregulateanyactivitythatitfoundwasrelatedtotheeconomic  productivityofindividualcitizens...Underthe[se]theories...,itis   difficulttoperceiveanylimitationonfederalpower,eveninareas   suchascriminallawenforcement...whereStateshistoricallyhavebeen t  sovereign.Thus,ifweweretoaccepttheGovernmentsarguments, `  wearehardpressedtopositanyactivitybyanindividualthatCongress L  iswithoutpowertoregulate. %   105      8t` `   $` Thus,uncircumscribedaggregationcouldbecomeawaytounconstitutionallyavoidthe L   substantialeffectslimitationestablishedinL;pezanditsprogeny.Aggregationhastoexistlimited $  to regulation[]of[intrastate]activitiesthatariseoutoforareconnectedwithacommercial   transaction.| %   106      ׀Congressmayregulateindividualinstancesofintrastate economicactivitythat   might,throughrepetitionelsewhere,substantiallyaffect...interstatecommerce.0 %   107      ׀Butitmaynotrely p ontheaggregationprincipletoregulatenoncommercialintrastateconductthatlacksademonstrably H substantialrelationtointerstatecommerce. %   108      ׀Thatappearswhyitmakesperfectsensetoconsider  \ commercial,butnotprivate,transactions intheaggregate. %   109      ׀Foronlycommercialtransactions 4 operatewithinmarketsthateitherfunctionormaybecomeaffectedbyadjacentintrastatefactors,in   interstatecommerce.L  %   110         Ageneralfederalprohibitionofrobberyremainsconstitutionallysuspectalsobecauseit  impingesonanareaoftraditionalstateauthority.Acrudeuseofaggregatefinancialimpacttojustify   theapplicationofSection1951(a)toallnoncommercial,residentialrobberies,withoutacaseby t  caseanalysisoftheirdirectimpactuponinterstatecommerce,wouldsupplyarationalefor L  transformingtheCommerceClauseintothemeansforfederalinterventioninnearlyalllocal $` crimes. %   111       8  AstheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyexplained, [u]nder[theAmerican]federal   system,the Statespossessprimaryauthorityfordefiningandenforcingthecriminallaw.  %   112         Althoughthestatescanlegislateinanyfield,the Constitution...withhold[s]fromCongressaplenary  policepower. %   113      ׀FromtheearliestdaysoftheAmericanRepublic,itbecame clear[]thatCongress  cannotpunishfeloniesgenerally.| %   114      ׀TheCommerceClauseempowersCongresstoregulateinterstate   andforeigncommerce,andthatregulationmayincludecriminalproscriptionsandpenalties.But,as t  L;pezremindsus,thecommercepower,althoughbroadwithinitsdefinedsphere, issubjecttoouter L  limits.  %   115      ׀Certainspheresofconductdonotconstitutecommercialactivityandthuscannotbecome $`  regulateddirectlyandgenerallybyCongressinanexerciseofthecommercepower.Theseareas 8  includepubliceducation,childrearing,marriageanddivorce,andaboveall,violentcrime.X  %   116         Excepttotheextentthatitmayappearboundtoacommercialactivity,robberyexistsasa   traditionalcrimefallingwithintheheartlandoftraditional criminallawenforcement,anareain  which Stateshistoricallyhavebeensovereign.Therobberyofaprivateindividualinhisresidence \ classifiesasafelonyineverystateoftheUnionandintheTerritories,andhasbeensincebeforethe 4p foundationoftheAmericanRepublic.  %   117      ׀Noindicationhassurfacedthatstatesappearunwillingor  H unabletoenforcetheirrobberylaws. %   118      ׀ApplyingtheaggregationdevicetoSection1951(a)would  thusresultinabroadintrusiononasubjectoftraditionalandthoroughstateregulation.Thatshould   weighheavilyagainstextendingfederalpoweroverallorsubstantiallyallrobberyas necessaryand t  propertoprotectinterstatecommerce.Evenwithoutpreemption,thefederalizationoflocalcrimes L   displace[s]statepolicychoicesonwhatactivitiestoprohibit,whatsubstantiveandprocedural $` rightstograntcriminaldefendants,andwhatpunishmentstometeout. 8  ThatshouldnothappenundertheConstitution.TheCommerceClausemustavoidbecoming   interpretedasasubtlegrantofaplenarypolicepowertothefederalgovernment.Thatprovision   speaksonlyof commerce,andonlyofsuchcommerceinvolvingmorethanonestateorsovereign  nation.0 %   119      ׀Toextractageneralpolicepowerfromthatlimitedgrantwouldflatlydisregardthestated \ intentionsoftheFramersoftheConstitution,whoenvisionedthat [t]hepowersreservedtothe 4p severalStateswillextendtoalltheobjectswhich,intheordinarycourseofaffairs,concernthelives,  liberties,andpropertiesofthepeople,andtheinternalorder,improvement,andprosperityofthe   State. %   120       t  ReadingtheCommerceClausetopermitfederalcriminalregulationoveranybehaviorwith L  aggregateeconomicsignificancealsowouldimproperlyeradicateanylimitationsonCongresss $` enumeratedpowersaddressingcrimeandintrastateviolence.| %   121      ׀Aviewthatthefederalgovernment 8  canregulatemostbasicandtraditionalcrimesfullycontradictstheConstitutionsgrantof   congressionalauthorityovercrimeinonlyfourverydiscreteareas. %   122      ׀Thatviewalsowouldrender   superfluousArticleIV,Section4,whichsetsoutthelimitedroleforCongressinregulatinglocal  crimewithintheStates: [t]heUnitedStatesshall...protecteachof[theStatesofthisUnion]...on \ ApplicationoftheLegislature,oroftheExecutive(whentheLegislaturecannotbeconvened)against 4p domesticViolence.Byitsplainterms,theDomesticViolenceClauserequiresaproperrequestfrom  H aStatebeforethefederalgovernmentmayactagainstintrastateviolence. %   123      ׀Theexistenceofthese  powersshouldcreateastrongpresumptionagainstthederivationofadditionalpowerstocreate   federalcrimes.Underthesecircumstances,aregulationofacrimelikerobberysurelycannotrestas t  aregulationofcommercewithoutproofofsubstantialeffectoncommerceineveryindividualcase. L   C.TheJurisdictionalElementandthe deminimisstandard . $` ThepropositionthatCongresshasabroadnationalpowertoprohibitrobberyassuch,finds @  nosupportinthetermsoftheconstitutionalgrantofauthority [t]oregulateCommerce...amongthe   severalStates.4 %   124      ׀InSection1951(a)Congressintendedtorendertheprohibitionofrobbery   constitutionalbas